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right to decision by public opinion. Under the rights of leisure are classed the right to comfort, the right to leisure, the right to recreation, the right to cleanliness, and the right to scenery. As exceptional rights are classed the right to relief and the right of women to income. This whole discussion is most sane and clear, and deserves the attention of every thinker on social subjects.

SARAH E. SIMONS.

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Principles of Western Civilization. By BENJAMIN KIDD. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902.

THE main concept of this book is that we are at the present time passing into a stage of social evolution in which the interests of the present will be consciously subordinated to the demands of a greater future. In the historical philosophy of the author, the ancient world is taken as the characteristic age of the ascendancy of the present, as in it all thought and effort were concentrated upon immediate efficiency. The doctrines of early Christianity, on the other hand, heralded the reign of the future, which has, however, not as yet established itself, because the militarism and other absolutistic tendencies of the earlier era have not been completely superseded. The liberalism of the Manchestrian type is described as a particularly marked recrudescence of the reign of the present—a philosophy in which the welfare of existing individuals alone determines the content of the ethical system. A truer liberalism has, however, dawned: one in which free competition, carried on with the greatest intensity, will continue to reign; where truth will be conceived of as the resultant of conflicting forces; and where the interests of the future are to be clearly recognized as the cardinal element in the ethical system, as the sole factor by which the meaning of present existence can be determined.

The author's cause for action is the same as in his earlier work; namely, the narrowness of the ideals of classical liberalism, and the evident impulse of the thinking and working world to conceive ideals of wider reach and deeper meaning. But the solution which is here attempted invites at the outset the criticism that it is altogether too vague, and has not been reduced to that exactness which even an idealistic philosophy demands. The author confuses the universal, the ethical, and the future; and he assumes that whatever transcends the narrow interests of the individual may be classed as belonging to the system of the ascendancy of the future. The assumption that the uni-

versal, which gives all existences their meaning, is being worked out in the future, and hence that the future is superior to the present, is at first sight very plausible, and opens up an inviting vista of thought; but, in the form which it has been given by the author, it is totally devoid of content, confused, and unilluminating. In order that the future may be actually ascendant in the consciousness of living individuals, it must, of course, be assumed that future development can be predetermined with sufficient accuracy to form a basis of ethical judgments and of motives; otherwise the entire system of ethics would vanish into the air. In other words, if the future is to control, it must control through becoming part of consciousness. In every other sense it has controlled long ago, both because the forces of evolution have always been active, and because men at all times have peered into the future, and have, as far as possible, directed their actions toward the end of the most permanent efficiency. If more is to happen, it can come about only by a clearer conception of the actual contents of the future, which would virtually be rendering the future a part of the present. This metaphysical puzzle of placing the controlling center of human action beyond consciousness the author has done nothing to solve. Apparently the only way out of it is to take refuge in the idea of the subconscious or of the unconscious, in the mystic forces of human nature, or in the creation of a religion of the future; of course, if this were done, the philosophical meaning of the author's contention would be destroyed. So we cannot avoid the conclusion that, beyond the general idea that in forming our ethical judgments we must look toward the future, the author's theory is devoid of positive content. It points the way rather to an evolutionary religion, or an evolutionary poetry, than to an evolutionary philosophy, because the first object of the latter should be to explain the actual processes of evolution; and that the author's theory absolutely fails to do.

The sharp division which the author introduces between systems of civilization in which the present is ascendant, and those which presage an ascendancy of the future, does not correspond with the facts which have been scientifically ascertained by history, and, we may almost say, which are matter of current knowledge. While the ancient world lacked the theory of evolution, it certainly, in the conduct of life, was by no means devoid of the feeling that the future development of the state is of the highest importance. Nor is it necessary to point out that, when Christian doctrine took the place of ancient philosophy, it was not the future, in the sense of the general

theory of the author, that formed the objective point of the Christian system of ethics. Nowhere is it clearer that the author confuses the universal, the ethical, and the future. The Christian religion certainly does not distinctively hold that the existence which transcends the individual is necessarily in the future; it is rather the perfect nature of God, in which the insufficiency of man finds its complement. On p. 385 the author says: "Our economic progress represents the steps in a slowly ascending development, in which the winning systems are those within which the economic process is tending to reach the highest intensity as the result of the gradual subordination of the particular to the universal." It is this subordination of the particular to the universal that the author nowhere clearly distinguishes from the subordination of the existing to the future.

In the first stage of social evolution, according to the author, nations demonstrate their right to survival by military prowess, and it is only in those nations which at present have demonstrated their power "that there can be developed that principle of social efficiency which in the second epoch of social evolution must ultimately subordinate organized society itself to its own future." The author does not, however, show why it is to be expected that the nations which represent the highest potentialities in civilization may soon be able to do without the power of defending their ideals. While western civilization is still confronted with countless millions who are inspired by alien and hostile ideals, it is difficult to see, upon the basis provided by the author, how his theory that the ascendancy of the present will before long cease can be true. Moreover, the sharp division introduced by the author between ancient and modern civilization in no way accounts for the actual process of social development, and entirely overlooks the fact of a gradually widening social consciousness, embracing successively the family, the clan, the tribe, the city, the nation, and perhaps destined finally to embrace the world.

When the author applies his theory to individual institutions, the result is no more luminous than is the general theory itself. His treatment of slavery is characteristic of his *a priori* methods. In the gradual disappearance of slavery in the ancient world, economic causes are declared to have been merely secondary. The deeper principles of civilization which express themselves in manumissions *pro remedio animae* constitute the real motive power. No serious writer has ever dared to deal with a subject of so great complexity in such an off-hand manner. Ancestral worship is declared a distinctive element of the

ascendency of the present. The reason for this is not apparent, and it seems that this institution with equal truth might be explained by the ascendency of the past, or even, as embodying some general ideal, by the ascendency of the future. In a similar manner, and with more apparent reason, infanticide is numbered among the institutions of the reign of the present. His treatment of these practices indicates that the author has given very little thought to oriental civilization, which it would certainly be very difficult for him to compress into the formula of the ascendency of the present.

According to the author, tolerance can be explained only as a conviction of the religious consciousness. Here, too, while the general view is plausible, it fails utterly to explain the actual historical growth of religious toleration, unless atheism or agnosticism be considered expressions of religious feeling. It could certainly be argued, with greater reason, that the methods of scientific investigation are the true basis of toleration, notwithstanding the ultimate intolerance of Comte's positivism. The author's method is well illustrated by his treatment of the theory of social evolution held by Schmoller and Schäffle, which traces the gradually expanding social and political consciousness from the family and clan through the city-state to the nation. The author says that Schmoller gives us no real answer as to the controlling force in this evolution, and he then proceeds to supply the deficiency in the following manner: "It is no mere expansion of a race or of a nationality. It is the conquering march of principles becoming conscious. . . . It represents the slow convergence toward each other in a majestic process of natural development of the forces and factors with which the ultimate meaning of our civilization is identified, and under the control of which the world is destined to pass in the future toward which we continue to move." It is pleasant to imagine the inward embarrassment of Professor Schmoller when he sees this simple and illuminating explanation.

In the latter part of the work the author attempts to outline the elements of the future civilization. He insists that, in the social state toward which we are moving, free competition, upheld by a tolerance based upon deep religious feeling, will be a cardinal element. He does not, however, make the least contribution toward the solution of the question how competition can be preserved against the absolutisms which are "closing down" on all sides. Nor does he show how competition in the future stage will differ from competition at present, nor how far the principle of *laissez faire* must be superseded by an exten-

sion of social control. The futility of this general theory is nowhere more apparent than when the author stands helpless before these fundamental problems of the present time.

It is to be lamented that, instead of working out clearly some of his ideas and their application to institutions, the author has consumed so much of his time in useless repetition, and in exclamatory rhetoric about the cosmic process and the overwhelming significance of projected efficiency. Indeed, the author's style may be called myopic. Possibilities loom grandly before him, but the outlines are not clearly and distinctly seen. He is constantly surprised at his own thought, and the idea of "the world-process trembling on the brink of consciousness" disturbs his peace of mind and calmness of judgment. So much of a mannerism has his constant surprise become that he is "profoundly impressed" even by the *superficiality* of other writers. Mr. Kidd has indeed produced a significant work, or rather a symptomatic work. One of the most discouraging characteristics of the present time is the growing adverseness of large numbers of people to the patient processes of research by which alone progress can be made in the sciences. Rapid generalizations and bold theories which cast the experience of a century to the winds are much easier to produce and much more "striking;" but such systems and theories, though they may contain attractive and even significant thoughts, can hope to be of permanent influence and usefulness only when they themselves rest upon a sound foundation of scientific knowledge, and do not utterly disregard the accepted results of the scientific work of the civilized world.

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The American Federal State: A Text-Book in Civics for High Schools and Academies. By ROSCOE LEWIS ASHLEY, A.M. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902. Pp. xlv+599.

THIS text-book in civics departs somewhat from the old-fashioned text-book treatment of the subject, in that it attempts to combine in one volume an exposition of political theory, American political history, and a discussion of the form and working of the American federal government. Mr. Ashley opens his book with an introductory chapter of some forty pages on "The Elements of Politics," and then devotes 156 pages to the historical development of our form of govern-